New Questions About Essay for Scholarship Samples Answered and Why You Must Read Every Word of This Report

<h1> New Questions About Essay for Scholarship Samples Answered and Why You Must Read Every Word of This Report </h1> <p>The General Management Admissions Test (GMAT) is the most normally utilized state administered test utilized in the business school application method. Understudies are encouraged to start accumulating grant materials in any event three to about a month prior to the cutoff time to verify they have the opportunity to complete their application. Before applying for a grant, they ought to analyze the qualification rules. </p> <p>The paper grants you to include data which you were unable to work into the various pieces of the application. Adhere to a story structure when fabricating your exposition, it'll be less hard for you to tell your very own encounters. By complementing your qualities by your composition, you will be ready to viably impart that you're a meriting contender for their honor. Make certain to track with the right organiza tion, comprising of the general segments of an article. </p> <h2>The Downside Risk of Essay for Scholarship Samples </h2> <p>Don't neglect to start your paper strongit ought to have the ability to start the interests of your perusers. At the point when you comprehend what your article should address, invest a little energy conceptualizing thoughts. You should start dealing with your exposition after conceivable to forestall any errors. An individual article is a device that is used to adjust all members who may have various assortments of encounters or achievements. </p> <h2>Essay for Scholarship Samples Explained </h2> <p>Write with enthusiasm and trustworthiness, and you'll surely establish a generally excellent connection. It is accepted to be totally the most huge part your application, since the grant board of trustees will utilize this to survey who you are as an individual, and your standpoint throughout everyday life. Show your excitement, and how intrigued you're with regards to genuinely being a part of their program. Particularly, compose the strategy by which the grant can assist you with continueing your training including the money related states of your relatives and how you'll be able to help them also. </p> <p>Begin with your accomplishments during your first level of training, which may fuse both scholarly and noncurricular exercises. It's attractive to submit to the specific prerequisites. In a third passage it is conceivable to clarify your enthusiasm for learning at that specific organization and the amount you'll be able to pick up from it. Understudies are urged to seek after degrees that will help them serve others locally. </p> <p>The absolute initial step to any article composing is to choose a subject of intrigue. For composing your grant exposition, the absolute first point is to make an extraordinary layout. You don't have to have the absolute best composing ab ilities in order to be innovative and create a compelling paper. There's no perfect formula for composing an exposition, yet there are a couple of fixings that you can add to make it significantly all the more engaging. </p> <p>The grant paper models shared here are an incredible arrangement in revealing to you the best approach to create the perfect grant article. In this manner, there are various ways an exposition can be composed. In the event that you find that it's hard to form articles, consider talking about the paper theme when recording the discussion. Short articles are still spend the sort of formal paper on the grounds that the parts should get remembered for it.</p> <h2> Top Essay for Scholarship Samples Secrets </h2> <p>The passage is totally free, yet an understudy may simply enter 1 time 2. Furthermore, it's in your absolute best enthusiasm to document your application ahead of schedule to forestall any very late web traffic inconveniences. Remember, outwardly the envelope, list the name of the specific grant you're asking about. Moreover, one is a 500-word answer and the other one is a 1,000-word reaction.</p> <p>The paper is your chance to show how you are the ideal delegate. For anybody to be given a grant, their article should be on point even should they have great scores and grades. Short papers are significant when one is wanting to introduce a significant subject without expecting to make bounty out of words or utilizing a few pages. Perusing great articles composed by others would assist you with understanding that distinction. </p> <p>Scholarship supports begin searching for candidates with vision and inspiration, so they may get some information about your objectives and yearnings. Furthermore, don't be terrified to substantiate yourself idealistic, gave that you're straightforward and humble. </p> <p>You could likewise clarify why you require money related help for school. To have the absolute best possibility at winning grants, you should see how to start your paper off great. On the off chance that you need more cash to cover school, almost certainly, you will apply for a few school grants. </p> <p>Write a framework, making a rundown of the vital highlights you will eagerly incorporate to the content. You may need to create various drafts until you get to the form you're truly satisfied of. The all out organization of your exposition, for instance, text dimension and edges, will exclusively depend on the directions offered to you. </p> <p>Be sure your article is conveniently composed, and that there's loads of void area' on the site page. On the off chance that you have any issues or questions, visit the Contact Us page and put in your inquiry under remarks. Valuable criticism can assist you with thinking of the absolute best version of your app lication paper. Suitable arranging is an unquestionable requirement in the event that you might want your paper to sell yourself well. </p>

Lackawanna College Essay Topics: the Ultimate Convenience!

<h1> Lackawanna College Essay Topics: the Ultimate Convenience! </h1> <h2>What You Need to Know About Lackawanna College Essay Topics </h2> <p>It's smarter to ask someone who hasn't seen it yet to see, as they're probably going to watch botches you won't get. Clearly, you can pick any subject, no one would ever realize that you're depicting experience that you never really had, yet remember that it is constantly less difficult to come clean than to design lies. Different things to different people, since the circumstance requested. Out of nowhere, you're in a fresh out of the box new circumstance, and should accomplish something, however you need zero thought what. </p> <h2> A History of Lackawanna College Essay Topics Refuted </h2> <p>Get the entirety of your school papers managed without leaving your home! Be sure to consider that the cost of instruction incorporates the cost of living for the time of study. School is a scholarl y spot so endeavor to persuade the board that you're the best possible individual as they would see it. Each understudy requires help with schoolwork occasionally. </p> <p>Nearly the entirety of our journalists are specialists who can write in at least at least three exceptional orders. For English speakers, you may have a choice of an essayist from the usa, Great Britain, Australia or Canada. Partner you should do is to effectively present your request guidelines and make the installment. </p> <p>The cost of a paper relies on the amount of exertion the author needs to apply. The most much of the time experienced paper composing administration that by far most of our customers require is article composing. Whatever school exposition theme you select or are doled out, the mystery is to form an astounding stand-apart article. At the point when you illuminate us pretty much all regarding the paper data, we'll start attempting to locate an appropriate author for your paper. </p> <p>1 significant thing that you ought to do when composing your paper is to assist it with getting individual. An anticipated exposition doesn't stick out. Composing quality papers is the chief motivation behind our administrations. In the event that you haven't been given a brief to expound on, you need to deliver your own fascinating inventive papers. </p> <p>Bridget's paper is incredibly solid, yet there keep on being a couple seemingly insignificant details that could be improved. Points like passing and separation are preventative as they can be exceedingly testing to expound on. Your reaction shouldn't be a book report. </p> <h2>Definitions of Lackawanna College Essay Topics </h2> <p>Lackawanna College entrance is the chief flexibly of individual, scholarly, and money related data which might be very important to each understudy. Expound on why it'll be essential to you and why you ought to get an advanced degree. Request and buy fruitful school papers to apply to get a school that you wish to learn at. The school additionally endeavors to offer most extreme thoughtfulness regarding each understudy and the general level of progress. </p> <p>If you've just moved on from school or college and are searching for an awesome activity, you should get an enticing resume to intrigue your future business. Composing a school exposition can be a difficult errand at first, however seeing how various subjects of school articles work may help you later on. Composing application papers is among the most distressing parts of the school application practice. Composing the school application exposition is a difficult gig. </p> <p>The sports exposition is unsurprising and should be maintained a strategic distance from, assuming there is any chance of this happening. Contrasting your current self with the individual which you were before is alright. On the off chance that you are scanning for school exposition models, here's an incredible one beneath. It would be ideal if you note that a couple of these school paper models could be reacting to prompts that are done being utilized. </p> <p>Students are frequently asked to clarify the purpose behind what good reason they need to find out about a particular school or scholarly field in these supplemental papers, which are commonly shorter than the chief exposition. They realize that how will generally be imaginative. They have occupied existences and frequently disregard an up and coming cutoff time. Most understudies react that way. </p>

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challengers Disaster - 1925 Words

The Lessons That Engineers Can Learn From The Challenger's Disaster (Term Paper Sample) Content: Memo number: Date: To: From: Lesson Engineers Learn from The Challenger Disaster Introduction The main concept behind this paper is to understand the lessons that engineers can learn from the challenger’s disaster. In the year 1997 on February 18th, it was a proud day for Nasa with the new discoveries and innovations in space exploration. Seven years later the challenger disaster hit the world with the space shuttle disintegrating seventy-three seconds after launching. This was a great disaster not only to the world but also to the world of engineering. From this incidents engineers learn many codes and ethical conducts which they should always observe while I their engineering world. Reflecting from the overall incident I will be able to discuss three main lesson that â€Å"New engineers† can learn from this. My main focus will be on the technical problem that the designers and engineers of this space shuttle try to relate with the cause of the disaster referred to as the O-ring problem. Background After the challenger disaster seven people lost their lifes. According to the research carried out to determine the cause of this tragedy, the cause of the disaster was the results of compromising of a crucial component of the shuttle by the cold weather on the launch day. However, there was still pressure to launch the shuttle and belief in the infallibility of the decision-making process which also have contributed to this failure. The engineers of this shuttle were so cautious and they warned their superiors that the shuttle O-ring were vulnerable to failure due to the cold weathers. It was later established that two rubber O-rings that were designed to separate the part of the rocket booster had failed due to the cold temperatures experienced that morning. This event hit the media causing the Nasa company to temporary stop its space operations. The O-ring failure caused a breakage of the solid rocket booster joining parts, allowing high pressurized flames that consisted of hydrogen and oxygen within the solid rocket motor to get to the outside and influenced upon all the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and the external fuel tank thus resulting into a blast that caused fire. This caused the separation of the right hand SRB’s aft field joint attachments and also the structural failure of the external tank. According to design information about the shuttle, it did not have an escape system, and the force at which it hit the ocean floors was too violent for any member of the crew to survive.The crew members were later removed from the oceans after a lengthy search. There were many factors that contributed to the challenger’s accident. Nasa management was one of the cause. Since it landed the first man in space the organization started focusing on public display other than true engineering technology. After the second space mission engineers discovered that the ship had problems with the O- rings due to erosion. However, they did not take this issue serious which resulted in these accident. Even after the O-rings erosion was established and later termed as a critical issue that would lead to damages no engineer at Nasa looked into the issue. Discussion Focusing on Feynman’s point the O-ring problem. From the Feynman’s report about cause of the shuttle disaster engineers can learn that technical trouble shooting and consulting is required before launching any new inventories in the engineering field. The flames that blow by the O-ring causing structural failure were attributed to a design flaw. Feynman once showed how the O-rings become more less pliant and point to seal failure by dipping a specimen of the material used to design the O-rings I a glass of ice cold water to show how the cold weather affect the O-rings. Feynman’s investigation report shows that there a disconnect between the Nasa’s engineers and the executives. From the report engineers are advised to give a good presentation of results they find out from a tragedy or an investigation. Edward Tufte who is a data scientist clearly illustrated how bad presentation of data can be deadly. He points out that the graph the Nasa’s engineers used were not meant to obfuscate trends, but they did not privilege style of substance. From the discussed events before the occurrence of the tragedy, poor quality, a needless rocket motif and arrangement by date, instead o focusing on the important issues of temperature. Feynman’s results showed that every launch at a temperature below 66 degrees resulted in O-rings failure. The engineers knew that launching of the shuttle below this temperature would be a failure but, without any questioning their superiors allowed the launch of the shuttle. However, according to Feynman the disaster can not be directly be associated with engineers but the Nasa’ s management. In his report Feynman says t hat Nasa had become less strict in certification for flight readiness. He say the then continues and says that the problem was as a resultof the engineers negligence, basing their argument that same flight had been flown before with no failure. As the result similar weaknesses and problems were accepted repeatedly leading to the disaster. The launch delay was another very important aspect that clearly reflects why engineers should not be negligent due to some external factors. The first postponement of the challenger’s mission was due to weather prediction that indicated occurrence of rains and cold temperature. According to rules that govern mission launch, postponement should not be done. But due to the political influence, the Vice president visit to witness the launch the engineers choose to ignore this fact and listened to the management to delay the launch which later costed them Maintaining standards is another important aspect that engineers should learn this event. From Feynman’s point engineers can learn that standard matters in every aspect of engineering. Looking at the solid rocket booster, this are most important elements in the operation of the shuttle. Without these elements the shuttle can not generate enough thrust that can overcome the earths force of gravity to travel to the space. Engineering speculations indicate thatsolid rocket booster should be mountedon both side of the external fuel tank. Each booster should be at least 149 feet long and 13 feet in diameter and before the ignition is done each booster should contain a minimum weight of 2 million pounds. Solid rockets are believed to produce more thrust than their counterpart fuel tanks. Once the rocket fuel has be ignited it is almost impossible to control it. From assumption of Feynman’s finding he indicates that there was failure in one of the SRB. According to him a proper design of these component was lacking, and the standards of the existing one was not maintained.(Hermann, 1945) The engineers knew very well the purpose of the O-rings was to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from the inside motor of the shuttle and yet they authorized the launch of a shuttle with a safety factor of 3. Before the night of the launch Thiokol’s engineering Vice president Bob Lund presented a report on the temperature at which the shuttle should be launched. He had concluded that 53 ⠁ ° F was the only temperature at which shuttle could be launched. However, according to Nasa’s engineer’s standard of temperature of launch which was 31⠁ °F the launch could be conducted. Later Feynman’s results of the research showed that the 31⠁ °F temperature was for the storage and the launch temperature was 45⠁ °F instead. This complication led to launching of the shuttle at allow temperature without even checking if the O-ring had experienced erosion. Later the Marshall’s Solid Rocket project manager, Larry Mulloy, says that the data that the engin...